2430 . Wrongful Discharge in V iolation of Public Policy - Essential
Factual Elements
[ Name of plaintiff ] claims [he/she/ nonbinary pr onoun ] was discharged from
employment for r easons that violate a public policy . It is a violation of
public policy [ specify claim in case, e.g., to dischar ge someone fr om
employment for r efusing to engage in price fixing ]. T o establish this claim,
[ name of plaintiff ] must prove all of the following:
1. That [ name of plaintiff ] was employed by [ name of defendant ];
2. That [ name of defendant ] discharged [ name of plaintiff ];
3. That [ insert alleged violation of public policy, e.g., “ [ name of
plaintiff ] ’s refusal to engage in price fixing ” ] was a substantial
motivating reason for [ name of plaintiff ]’s discharge;
4. That [ name of plaintiff ] was harmed; and
5. That the discharge was a substantial factor in causing [ name of
plaintiff ] harm.
New September 2003; Revised June 2013, June 2014, December 2014, November
2018, May 2020
Directions for Use
The judge should determine whether the purported reason for firing the plaintif f
would amount to a violation of public policy . (See Gantt v . Sentry Insurance (1992)
1 Cal.4th 1083, 1092 [4 Cal.Rptr .2d 874, 824 P .2d 680]; overruled on other grounds
in Gr een v . Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80 fn. 6 [78 Cal.Rptr .2d
16, 960 P .2d 1046].) The jury should then be instructed that the alleged conduct
would constitute a public-policy violation if proved.
Note that there are two causation elements. First, there must be causation between
the public policy violation and the discharge (element 3). This instruction uses the
term “substantial motivating reason” to express this causation element. “[S]ubstantial
motivating reason” has been held to be the appropriate standard for cases alleging
termination in violation of public policy . ( Alamo v . Practice Management
Information Corp. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 466, 479 [161 Cal.Rptr .3d 758]; see
Harris v . City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 232 [152 Cal.Rptr .3d 392,
294 P .3d 49]; CACI No. 2507, “Substantial Motivating Reason” Explained .)
Element 5 then expresses a second causation requirement; that the plaintif f was
harmed as a result of the wrongful discharge.
If plaintif f alleges the plaintif f was forced or coerced to resign, then CACI
No. 2431, Constructive Dischar ge in V iolation of Public Policy - Plaintiff Requir ed
to V iolate Public Policy , or CACI No. 2432, Constructive Discharge in V iolation of
Public Policy - Plaintiff Requir ed to Endur e Intolerable Conditions That V iolate
Public Policy , should be given instead. See also CACI No. 2510, “Constructive
Dischar ge” Explained .
This instruction may be modified for adverse employment actions other than
discharge, for example demotion, if done in violation of public policy . (See Gar cia
v . Rockwell Internat. Corp. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1556, 1561 [232 Cal.Rptr . 490],
disapproved on other grounds in Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1093 [public policy
forbids retaliatory action taken by employer against employee who discloses
information regarding employer ’ s violation of law to government agency].) See also
CACI No. 2509, “Adverse Employment Action” Explained .
For an instruction on damages, give CACI No. 3903P , Damages Fr om Employer for
W rongful Dischar ge (Economic Damage).
Sources and Authority
• “ ‘[W]hile an at-will employee may be terminated for no reason, or for an
arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate for an unlawful
reason or a purpose that contravenes fundamental public policy . Any other
conclusion would sanction lawlessness, which courts by their very nature are
bound to oppose.’ ” ( Casella v . SouthW est Dealer Services, Inc. (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 1 127, 1 138-1 139 [69 Cal.Rptr .3d 445], internal citations omitted.)
• “[W]hen an employer ’ s discharge of an employee violates fundamental principles
of public policy , the discharged employee may maintain a tort action and recover
damages traditionally available in such actions.” ( T ameny v . Atlantic Richfield
Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 170 [164 Cal.Rptr . 839, 610 P .2d 1330].)
• “The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are
(1) an employer-employee relationship, (2) the employer terminated the
plaintif f’ s employment, (3) the termination was substantially motivated by a
violation of public policy , and (4) the discharge caused the plainti ff harm.”
( Gar cia-Br ower v . Pr emier Automotive Imports of CA, LLC (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 961, 973 [269 Cal.Rptr .3d 856], internal citation omitted.)
• “[T]his court established a set of requirements that a policy must satisfy to
support a tortious discharge claim. First, the policy must be supported by either
constitutional or statutory provisions. Second, the policy must be ‘public’ in the
sense that it ‘inures to the benefit of the public’ rather than serving merely the
interests of the individual. Third, the policy must have been articulated at the
time of the discharge. Fourth, the policy must be ‘fundamental’ and
‘substantial.’ ” ( Stevenson v . Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 889-890 [66
Cal.Rptr .2d 888, 941 P .2d 1 157], footnote omitted.)
• “Policies are not ‘public’ (and thus do not give rise to a common law tort claim)
when they are derived from statutes that ‘simply regulate conduct between
private individuals, or impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate
fundamental public policy concerns.’ ” ( Diego v . Pilgrim United Church of
Christ (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 913, 926 [180 Cal.Rptr .3d 359].)
CACI No. 2430 WRONGFUL TERMINA TION
• “[T]he cases in which violations of public policy are found generally fall into
four categories: (1) refusing to violate a statute; (2) performing a statutory
obligation (3) exercising a statutory right or privilege; and (4) reporting an
alleged violation of a statute of public importance.” ( Gantt , supra , 1 Cal.4th at
pp. 1090-1091, internal citations and footnote omitted, overruled on other
grounds in Gr een, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 80, fn. 6; accord Stevenson, supra , 16
Cal.4th at p. 889.)
• “[T]ermination of an employee most clearly violates public policy when it
contravenes the provision of a statute forbidding termination for a specified
reason . . . .” ( Diego, supra , 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 926)
• “[Discharge because of employee’ s] [r]efusal to violate a governmental
regulation may also be the basis for a tort cause of action where the
administrative regulation enunciates a fundamental public policy and is
authorized by statute.” ( Scott v . Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th
702, 708-709 [96 Cal.Rptr .3d 159].)
• “In the context of a tort claim for wrongful discharge, tethering public policy to
specific constitutional or statutory provisions serves not only to avoid judicial
interference with the legislative domain, but also to ensure that employers have
adequate notice of the conduct that will subject them to tort liability to the
employees they dischar ge . . . .” ( Stevenson, supra , 16 Cal.4th at p. 889.)
• “[A]n employee need not prove an actual violation of law; it suf fices if the
employer fired him for reporting his ‘reasonably based suspicions’ of illegal
activity .” ( Gr een, supra , 19 Cal.4th at p. 87, internal citation omitted.)
• “[A]n employer ’ s authority over its employee does not include the right to
demand that the employee commit a criminal act to further its interests, and an
employer may not coerce compliance with such unlawful directions by
discharging an employee who refuses to follow such an order . . . .” ( T ameny ,
supra , 27 Cal.3d at p. 178.)
• “[T]here is a ‘fundamental public interest in a workplace free from illegal
practices . . . .’ ‘[T]he public interest is in a lawful, not criminal, business
operation. Attainment of this objective requires that an employee be free to call
his or her employer ’ s attention to illegal practices, so that the employer may
prevent crimes from being committed by misuse of its products by its
employees.’ ” ( Y au v . Allen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 157 [176 Cal.Rptr .3d
• “Whether an employer has conducted an adequate investigation before
dismissing an employee for an unlawful purpose is generally a question of fact
for the jury .” ( Gar cia-Br ower , supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 974.)
• “An action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy ‘can only be
asserted against an employer . An individual who is not an employer cannot
commit the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; rather , he or
she can only be the agent by which an employer commits that tort.’ ” ( Kim v .
WRONGFUL TERMINA TION CACI No. 2430
Konad USA Distribution, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1351 [172
Cal.Rptr .3d 686], original italics.)
• “Sex discrimination in employment may support a claim of tortious discharge in
violation of public policy .” ( Kelley v . The Conco Cos. (201 1) 196 Cal.App.4th
191, 214 [126 Cal.Rptr .3d 651].)
• “In sum, a wrongful termination against public policy common law tort based on
sexual harassment can be brought against an employer of any size.” ( Kim , supra ,
226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.)
• “T o establish a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy , an
employee must prove causation. (See CACI No. 2430 [using phrase ‘substantial
motivating reason’ to express causation].) Claims of whistleblower harassment
and retaliatory termination may not succeed where a plaintif f ‘cannot
demonstrate the required nexus between his reporting of alleged statutory
violations and his allegedly adverse treatment by [the employer].’ ” ( Ferrick v .
Santa Clara University (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1357 [181 Cal.Rptr .3d
• “It would be nonsensical to provide a dif ferent standard of causation in FEHA
cases and common law tort cases based on public policies encompassed by
FEHA.” ( Mendoza v . W estern Medical Center Santa Ana (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th
1334, 1341 [166 Cal.Rptr .3d 720].)
• “If claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy must track
FEHA, it necessarily follows that jury instructions pertinent to causation and
motivation must be the same for both. Accordingly , we conclude the trial court
did not err in giving the instructions set forth in the CACI model jury
instructions.” ( Davis v . Farmers Ins. Exchange (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1302,
1323 [200 Cal.Rptr .3d 315].)
• “Under California law , if an employer did not violate FEHA, the employee’ s
claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy necessarily fails.”
( Featherstone v . Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 1 150, 1 169 [217 Cal.Rptr .3d 258].)
• “FEHA ’ s policy prohibiting disability discrimination in employment is
suf ficiently substantial and fundamental to support a claim for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy .” ( Rope v . Auto-Chlor System of
W ashington, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 635, 660 [163 Cal.Rptr .3d 392].)
• “Although the fourth cause of action references FEHA as one source of the
public policy at issue, this is not a statutory FEHA cause of action. FEHA does
not displace or supplant common law tort claims for wrongful discharge.” ( Kim ,
supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349.)
• “[T]o the extent the trial court concluded Labor Code section 132a is the
exclusive remedy for work-related injury discrimination, it erred. The California
Supreme Court held ‘[Labor Code] section 132a does not provide an exclusive
remedy and does not preclude an employee from pursuing FEHA and common
CACI No. 2430 WRONGFUL TERMINA TION
law wrongful dischar ge remedies.’ ” ( Prue v . Brady Co./San Diego, Inc. (2015)
242 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1381 [196 Cal.Rptr .3d 68].)
• “California’ s minimum wage law represents a fundamental policy for purposes
of a claim for wrongful termination or constructive discharge in violation of
public policy .” ( V asquez v . Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 819, 831-832 [166 Cal.Rptr .3d 242].)
• “ ‘Labor Code section 1 102.5, subdivision (b), which prohibits employer
retaliation against an employee who reports a reasonably suspected violation of
the law to a government or law enforcement agency , reflects the broad public
policy interest in encouraging workplace “whistleblowers,” who may without
fear of retaliation report concerns regarding an employer ’ s illegal conduct. This
public policy is the modern day equivalent of the long-established duty of the
citizenry to bring to public attention the doings of a lawbreaker . [Citation.]
. . .’ ” ( Ferrick, supra , 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1355.)
• “That [defendant]’ s decision not to renew her contract for an additional season
might have been influenced by her complaints about an unsafe working condition
. . . does not change our conclusion in light of the principle that a decision not
to renew a contract set to expire is not actionable in tort.” ( T ouchstone T elevision
Pr oductions v . Superior Court (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 676, 682 [145 Cal.Rptr .3d
766], original italics.)
• “ ‘ “[P]ublic policy’ as a concept is notoriously resistant to precise definition, and
. . . courts should venture into this area, if at all, with great care . . . .”
[Citation.] Therefore, when the constitutional provision or statute articulating a
public policy also includes certain substantive limitations in scope or r emedy ,
these limitations also cir cumscribe the common law wr ongful dischar ge cause of
action . Stated another way , the common law cause of action cannot be broader
than the constitutional provision or statute on which it depends, and therefore it
‘presents no impediment to employers that operate within the bounds of law .”
[Citation.]’ ” ( Dutra v . Mer cy Medical Center Mt. Shasta (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th
750, 756 [146 Cal.Rptr .3d 922], original italics.)
Secondary Sources
3 W itkin, Summary of California Law (1 1th ed. 2017) Agency and Employment,
§ 255 et seq.
Chin et al., California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation, Ch. 5-(I)B, W rongful
Dischar ge In V iolation Of Public Policy (T ameny Claims) , ¶¶ 5:47, 5:50, 5:70,
5:105, 5:1 15, 5:150, 5:151, 5:170, 5:195, 5:220, 5:235 (The Rutter Group)
1 W rongful Employment T ermination Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) Public Policy
V iolations, § 5.45
4 W ilcox, California Employment Law , Ch. 60, Liability for W r ongful T ermination
and Discipline , § 60.04 (Matthew Bender)
21 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 249, Employment Law:
T ermination and Discipline , §§ 249.12, 249.50-249.52 (Matthew Bender)
10 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 100, Employer and Employee: W rongful
WRONGFUL TERMINA TION CACI No. 2430
T ermination and Discipline , §§ 100.41-100.61B (Matthew Bender)
California Civil Practice: Employment Litigation §§ 6:23-6:25 (Thomson Reuters)
CACI No. 2430 WRONGFUL TERMINA TION
Page last reviewed May 2024
In this second of a two-part series of columns, Professor Citron argues that Roberts re-established his control over the Court by successfully weakening the administrative state and expanding presidential immunity while simultaneously avoiding controversial decisions on gun rights and reproductive issues, ultimately demonstrating his ability to push a conservative agenda without incurring significant political backlash.
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